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Much of Africa has not yet gone through a "demographic transition" to reduced mortality and fertility
rates.  The fact that the continent's countries remain mired in a Malthusian crisis of high mortality,
high fertility, and rapid population growth (with an accompanying state of chronic extreme poverty)
has been attributed to many factors ranging from the status of women, pro-natalist policies,  poverty
itself, and social institutions.  There remains, however, a large degree of uncertainty among demographers
as to the relative importance of these factors on a comparative or historical basis.  Moreover, econometric
estimation is complicated by endogeneity among fertility and other variables of interest.  We attempt
to improve estimation (particularly of the effect of the child mortality variable) by deploying exogenous
variation in the ecology of malaria transmission and in agricultural productivity through the staggered
introduction of Green Revolution, high-yield seed varieties.  Results show that child mortality (proxied
by infant mortality) is by far the most important factor among those explaining aggregate total fertility
rates, followed by farm productivity.  Female literacy (or schooling) and aggregate income do not
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 The broad categories of determinants of fertility are generally thought to be 
reasonably well identified by demographers, sociologists and economists, though the 
detailed quantitative determinants of fertility levels and changes are much less 
understood.  The relationships between fertility, on the one hand, and economic 
development, the status of women, access to family planning, pro-natalist or pro-planning 
policies of government, and mortality (both adult and child), on the other hand, have been 
elegantly theorized and extensively studied.  Likewise, many researchers have gone 
before us in empirically modeling these relationships in both cross-country and within-
country analyses.  And in this vein, many refinements have been made to these models 
over the last decade.   
In quantitative terms, however, we still lack a good understanding of why some 
countries have experienced significant reductions of fertility rates, while those in Africa 
remain with very high fertility rates—on average difference of almost three births 
between Sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of the developing world.  (See Figure 1, below, 
for the distribution of total fertility rates in the developing world.)  Are Africa’s high 
fertility rates the result of illiteracy, poverty, rural populations, discrimination against 
girls and women, high child mortality, lack of access of the poor to contraception?  What 
policies would be most supportive of a rapid, voluntary fertility transition?  This paper 
seeks to provide some new quantitative assessments of these questions.  We acknowledge 
from the start, however, that many of the potential explanatory variables are only 
imperfect proxies for the household and community-level drivers of fertility and fertility 
change.  Bongaarts (1984) posits that fertility is regulated directly by proximate 
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determinants (e.g. contraception, age at marriage, abortion), while socioeconomic 
variables (income, education, mortality) affect fertility only indirectly by modifying the 
proximate determinants.  Thus, we can aim only to get a rough quantitative assessment of 
the role of key categories of determinants, rather than precise point estimates of how 
specific policy changes would affect fertility rates.   
  [FIGURE ONE ABOUT HERE] 
Most theories of the demographic transition have put great stress, and we believe 
rightly so, on the causal link from high child mortality to high desired fertility.  Simply 
put, when parents do not know whether their children will survive, they respond by 
having large families.  In a high mortality context, cultural patterns – age of marriage, 
social norms in childrearing, community support structures – also favor high natality.  
The original model of the demographic transition, indeed, was driven almost solely by 
child mortality rates.  Exogenous changes to child mortality (e.g. the advent of public 
health, safe drinking water, immunizations, improved nutrition) were seen to be the basic 
driver to reduced fertility rates as well, albeit with a lag of one or more generations.  The 
lag reflected two things according to the standard analysis: first, the lag in perception of 
households that mortality rates had indeed come down persistently and reliably; and 
second, the lag in cultural norms surrounding marriage age, birth spacing, family size, 
and so forth, all needed to promote the transition from high to low fertility.  Many studies 
found, indeed, that the fertility transition is strongly conditioned by a preceding child 
mortality transition.   
One issue that continues to plague this basic line of research—and therefore 
which may be relevant to the African question—is the question of causal directionality 
 5
between child mortality and fertility choice.   Several scholars have shown that reduced 
family size affects human capital investment (Angrist, Lavy and Schlosser 2004; Conley 
and Glauber 2006; Black, Devereux and Salvanes 2006) on the micro level as well as 
economic growth at the macro level (Behrman and Rosenzweig 2001; Hazan and 
Berdugo 2002; Joshi and Schultz 2005; Moav 2005).  Likewise, the argument can be 
made that at least some of the powerful correlation of high child mortality and high 
fertility represents increased child mortality due to higher fertility thanks to increased 
strain on household caloric resources and decreased parental care and supervision with 
the addition of more children.  Similarly, government “family planning efforts” could be 
reflecting (rather than affecting) demand for reduced family size.  With these concerns in 
mind, in this paper we pursue a strategy of deploying some largely exogenous variation 
in geophysical conditions and agricultural technology to derive estimates of the causal 
impact of infant (as a proxy for child) mortality, rural productivity, availability of 
abortion, literacy and income on fertility.  We then discuss the implications of these 
findings for the lagging demographic transition in Africa. 
To preview our empirical approach, we argue that the ecology of malaria 
transmission is exogenous to fertility over the time period we are studying.  Malaria is 
currently the fourth leading cause of death (after neonatal disorders, diarrhea, and 
pneumonia) for children under five in low income countries1 and is responsible for at 
least one in every five child deaths in sub-Saharan Africa.2  Estimates of malaria 
                                                 
1 See Black (2003). 
 
2 Since infection with malaria leaves an individual more vulnerable to morbidity and mortality from other 
infections, malaria is an indirect as well as a direct killer.  It is very likely implicated in more than one fifth 
of all deaths.  In some malaria control trials, the reduction of malaria has reduced all-cause under-5 
mortality by as much as 40 percent.   
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mortality in Africa range from one million to three million deaths per year.  Malaria 
mortality, in turn, is highly sensitive to ecological conditions—as well as basic health 
infrastructure.  (More on this below.)   
Specifically, we deploy an ecological index of malaria transmission (used 
elsewhere as well; see, e.g., Sachs [2002]; Carstensen and Gundlach [2006]) that 
combines ecological factors—rainfall and temperature—with biological ones such as the 
human biting rate of the mosquito species that serves as the vector for the transmission of 
malaria to develop an index of malaria risk (see, Kiszewski (2004) and Sachs (2002) for 
more details on its construction).  The distribution of this malaria ecology index is shown 
graphically in Figure 2, below.  While the underlying factors determining malaria 
transmission may be endogenous to human population movements over the course of 
thousands of years (through co-evolution with mosquito species), we assert that from the 
point of view of the current demographic transition in recent decades the biophysical 
ecology of malaria transmission are exogenous. 
  [FIGURE TWO ABOUT HERE] 
However, since there may be lingering concerns that any cross-country 
differences may be reflecting unobservable heterogeneity, we also pursue a longitudinal 
strategy, instrumenting for infant mortality (as a proxy for child mortality) within 
countries over time.  Since the malaria ecology instrument does not vary over time – and 
therefore cannot be used as an instrument in a panel – we use the proportion of the 
population at risk of exposure to malaria.  The narrowing of the range of malaria 
transmission during the past 50 years, while subject to human control through the 
application of DDT and improved malaria case management in sub-tropical regions, 
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should not be endogenous to the fertility rate.  Some sub-tropical regions could use DDT 
to eliminate transmission – if these regions had low baseline rates of transmission to 
begin with – while most tropical regions, and especially sub-Saharan Africa, could not 
break malaria transmission through the application of existing technologies, since 
baseline rates of transmission were too high to be eliminated by existing technologies.3  
As we can see in Figure 3, below, at first blush, the geography of malaria risk over time 
overlaps—to a great extent—with the map of total fertility rates.  Note that neither the 
areas of malaria transmission nor the malaria ecology index include actual malaria cases 
or deaths, but only the transmission risks, which we argue should be exogenous to 
fertility.  It is important to note that a review of the medical literature shows that malaria 
may have a direct effect on fertility through malaria-related severe anemia, as well as 
through increased incidence of hypertensive diseases of pregnancy, spontaneous abortion, 
and maternal mortality.4  Since these prevent a live birth, and since TFR counts only live 
births, then this effect should work in the opposite direction of our putative causal model, 
thereby biasing any net effect on fertility toward zero.  However, there is some evidence 
that malaria may reduce lactation period (Bates et al. 2004), which might increase 
fertility through decreased child spacing.  Likewise, malaria in pregnancy is also 
associated with low birthweight and increased neonatal and infant mortality—which is in 
line with our models.   
                                                 
3 In technical terms, the question is whether the suite of intervention tools is enough to drive the basic 
reproduction number (R0) of malaria to below 1.  This depends strongly on the pre-intervention R0.  When 
the pre-intervention number is close to 1, elimination of transmission is feasible.  When it is much greater 
than 1 (and sometimes higher than 100 in rural Africa), then elimination of transmission is not feasible.  
Even with continuing transmission, however, control of illness and mortality is possible.  Thus, maps of 
malaria transmission may not change, while the burden of illness and death could change markedly.    
4 See for example Etard (2003), Maubert (1999) and Sartelet (1996) and Guyatt (2001).  See also 
http://www.rbm.who.int/cmc_upload/0/000/015/369/RBMInfosheet_4.htm for overview information on 
malaria in pregnancy.   
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   [FIGURE THREE ABOUT HERE] 
   [FIGURE FOUR ABOUT HERE] 
Third, we examine the impact on agricultural productivity of Green Revolution 
technologies.  Specifically, we argue that a country’s share of crops that use high-yield 
seed varieties has an important impact on agricultural productivity and therefore the 
allocation of women’s time between child rearing and farm work, as well as the returns to 
education.  High-yield seed varieties increase cereal yields per hectare.  These varieties 
also maximize calories per bushel (sometimes at the expense of micronutrients, which 
has been one of the critiques of Green Revolution technologies [see, e.g., Shiva 2005]).   
In 1945, the Rockefeller Foundation and the Mexican government established the 
Cooperative Wheat Research and Production Program (later CIMMYT, the International 
Maize and Wheat Improvement Center) to improve Mexico’s agricultural output, and 
especially wheat yields.5  By the middle 1960s, these technologies were developed for 
use in some other regions of the world, with help from many NGOs and financing from 
the World Bank.  In Asia, the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI) developed 
high-yield varieties of paddy rice.  By the late 1990s, almost half of East Asian crops are 
planted with such high yield, “Green Revolution” varieties; over two-thirds of South 
Asian farming is done with these seeds; but the corresponding figure for Sub-Saharan 
Africa is a mere 11 percent.  (See Table 1 and Figure 4, below).  Cereal yields—though 
determined by many co-factors such as fertilizer inputs, mechanization, irrigation, and 
natural geography and soil fertility—reflect these differences in Green Revolution 
diffusion.  Each extension of the Green Revolution technologies, from their home base in 
Japan and the U.S., to Mexico, India, East Asia, Latin America, and Africa, has depended 
                                                 
5 Norman Borlaug, who was instrumental to this effort, won the 1970 Nobel Peace Prize for his role. 
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on local research undertakings to adopt high-yield technologies to local crops, pests, and 
farm systems (e.g. rain-fed versus agricultural).  Africa has been a very late beneficiary 
of the Green Revolution, because of its distinctive mix of crops (so that successful 
breeding in other parts of the world were relatively difficult to transfer to Africa), its very 
high dependence on rain-fed agriculture (while the first generation of high-yield varieties 
depended on irrigation), and the chronically low levels of spending on research and 
development on African crop improvements.6      
 [TABLE ONE ABOUT HERE; FIGURE FOUR ABOUT HERE] 
Among those countries that have experienced the benefits of Green Revolution 
technologies, this increased caloric production should have both income and substitution 
effects.  That is, the increased income from better yields should allow for women to 
support more children; however, we argue here (and show empirically) that the 
substitution effect should swamp this effect, whereby women shift from the household 
labor of childrearing to more productive farm work and agro-processing.  Moreover, 
there is a more subtle but very important effect stressed by Rosenzweig (1982).  The 
high-yield varieties required higher skills from farmers, and thus raised the marginal 
returns to education.  Therefore, with a higher return to extra schooling, the advent of the 
Green Revolution tilted the quality-quantity tradeoff to lesser quantity and towards 
greater quality.     
Further, since high yield crops—a central component of the Green Revolution—
were developed by and for rich countries initially, we argue that among lower income 
countries, the availability of such seed varieties was largely exogenous to local 
                                                 
6 U.S. funding for Asian crop improvements was higher than for African crop improvements in part 
because the U.S. Government and influential foundations viewed Asian food security as part of the U.S.’s 
Cold War challenge.   Africa’s food insecurity elicited much less geopolitical concern. 
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demographic conditions.  In other words, the adoption of high yield grains was not 
demand driven.  For example, the first grains for which high yield crops were engineered 
were wheat (developed originally by Japan and the United States) and irrigated paddy 
rice (developed mainly by Japan in the first instance).  Maize came later, and later still 
came Africa’s distinctive tropical crops, including sorghum, dry rice, millet, teff, and 
cassava.  So countries like India, Taiwan, Korea, and China, which had climatic 
conditions appropriate for the first high yield crops enjoyed the cereal yield boons; 
something which we argue helped them undergo the demographic transition before those 
which had had to wait for the global network of agricultural research units to develop 
varieties later.    
Indeed, Evenson and Gollin (2003) have found that the Green Revolution 
occurred in two phases.  The first, in the late 1960s and early 1970s, consisted mainly of 
the diffusion of improved varieties of wheat and rice in Asia and Latin America.  For 
crops that are not grown in the developed countries, however, modern varieties were 
developed later.  Although the rate of development of improved crop varieties has 
increased since the 1960s, disparities still remain.  Relatively few improved varieties of 
crops such as millet and barley, which are grown primarily in semiarid and dry-land 
areas, existed until the 1980s.  Before the 1980s, only a few improved varieties had been 
developed specifically for regions such as the Middle East and North Africa and sub-
Saharan Africa.  Before we discuss our variables in more detail and our attempts to 
isolate the causality of these relationships, we first review the literature on the 





Chowdhury (1988) identifies three possible relationships between fertility and 
mortality: a lagged causal relationship from mortality to fertility (the theory of 
demographic transition and choice theory) whether through child “hoarding” (as a 
precautionary insurance mechanism to guarantee surviving heirs) (Heer 1968) or direct 
replacement (for a discussion see, e.g., Cleland 2001); a causal relationship from fertility 
to mortality (the Ricardian theory); and an interdependent relationship between mortality 
and fertility (the modern economic theory of population).  Perhaps the most influential 
recent model of fertility choice among economists is the economic theory of fertility 
offered by Becker and Barro (1988).  Assuming stable wage rates and interest rates, 
falling child mortality lowers the costs average cost of raising surviving children since a 
greater proportion of the total investment in childrearing costs realizes a benefit 
(assuming little or no benefits from non-surviving children).  Therefore, the authors argue 
that fertility rates will initially rise as child mortality declines (and cite evidence to this 
effect).  However, if there is no accompanying change in the parents’ interest or wage 
rates, they argue that there is no cumulative effect.  Thus, in the Becker-Barro model, any 
reduction in fertility resulting from a decline in child mortality would have to work 
indirectly through wage or interest rates. 
Many have attempted to elaborate on the Barro and Becker model theoretically as 
well as empirically.  For example, Doepke seeks to understand whether “stochastic 
outcomes and fertility choice are quantitatively important.” (p. 337) He differentiates 
between total fertility rate and net fertility rate, that latter being the average number of 
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children per woman surviving to age five.  Doepke concludes that child mortality is 
causally related to declining fertility rates, but that other factors are responsible for 
declines in net fertility.  With replacement as the mechanism, each family has a target 
number of children.  The death of one child induces the family to replace that child and, 
as a result, mortality directly affects total fertility rate.  However, for mortality to affect 
the net fertility rate, the hoarding motive would have to take place.  Parents would 
preemptively increase their fertility to protect against potential loss.  If this mechanism is 
present, then a decline in mortality would result in a decline in net fertility.  Doepke tests 
three models.  He reports that “all three models are consistent with declining total fertility 
rates (i.e. number of births) in response to falling mortality. However, we are left without 
a clear-cut prediction for the relationship of child mortality to net fertility (i.e. the number 
of survivors).” (344) 
In his attempts to test for causality, Chowdhury (1988) finds no consistent results 
across his thirty-five country sample.  Fourteen of his cases support the hypothesis that 
infant mortality causally impacts fertility, while only two cases support the opposite 
hypothesis.  The remaining cases indicate feedback between the two variables, or the 
absence of a relationship between fertility and mortality.  His results provide stronger 
support for the hypothesis that mortality effects fertility, but they are notably (and 
admittedly) inconclusive.  In contrast to Chowdhury, Zakir and Wunnava (1999) found 
that fertility rates impact mortality rates, and not vice-versa.  Their model employs simple 
GLS regression on cross-sectional data (and furthermore fails to distinguish between low- 
and high-income countries).  The simplicity of their equations (and the fact that they do 
not distinguish between low- and high-income countries, which probably experience very 
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different dynamics) fails to acknowledge the endogeneity of fertility and mortality, 
leading to a model that is notably mis-specified. 
Some strategies for isolating the child mortality-fertility causal pathway have 
relied on using adult (male) mortality as an instrument.  For example, Galloway et al. 
(1998) use adult male mortality to instrument infant mortality in a historical analysis of 
Prussian data from 1875 to 1910.  They claim that this measure of mortality may reflect 
other societal influences on child mortality (i.e. standard of living, nutrition, etc.), but 
should not reflect particular influences on breastfeeding associated with fertility.  
However, the common factors affecting both adult male mortality and child mortality are 
most likely correlated with fertility; furthermore, Lorentzen, McMillan, and Wacziarg 
(2005) have shown that adult mortality should have an independent effect on fertility 
(and child human capital investment) by changing the discount rate of mothers and 
fathers. 
  Seeking to better address the endogeneity of child mortality and fertility, Schultz 
(1997) instruments mortality using calorie availability.  However, the validity of his 
instrument is open to question, as one can imagine a direct, negative causal impact of 
calorie availability on fertility. In another attempt to deal with endogeneity concerns, 
Benefo and Schwartz (1996) instrument child mortality using variables for community 
health services and environment.  (These include: living farther from a market; living 
close to a clinic; amount of rainfall; malaria/measles.)  However, the authors discover 
that child mortality is only statistically significant if treated as an exogenous variable, but 
when instrumented by community health services and environment, mortality is not a 
statistically significant determinant of fertility.  Likewise, Dreze and Murthi (2001) 
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instrument mortality using the variable access to safe drinking water, claiming that the 
later variable should be unrelated to fertility except through its effect on mortality—again 
a questionable assumption since safe drinking water is related to economic development, 
which should have an independent effect on fertility.  Finally, a recent paper by Kalemli-
Ozcan (2006) examines the impact of AIDS mortality on halting the demographic 
transition in Sub-Saharan Africa by using circumcision prevalence as an instrument for 
AIDS risk.  She finds that the AIDS mortality crisis has indeed led to high fertility rates 
and less human capital investment in offspring. 
 
Economic Development and Total Fertility Rates 
In the Standard Growth Model (SGM), increased population growth lowers 
income because of capital dilution (Ahituv 2001: 51-52).  However, the Endogenous 
Fertility Growth Model (EFGM) links fertility to growth by endogenizing the fertility 
variables.  Ahituv (2001) seeks to compare the EFGM and the SGM to understand the 
interplay between economic development and fertility.  He “investigates the empirical 
consistency of the endogenous fertility growth model” and finds “strong evidence that the 
negative relations between fertility and GDP growth are a result of a bi-directional 
causality.” (68) Although the author recognizes the importance of finding a suitable 
instrument to address such endogeneity, his dataset offers no suitable instrument.  Others, 
however, have gone further in empirically specifying the bi-directionality of this 
relationship.  For example, Chen and Fang (2000) use 1980 fertility rates to instrument 
subsequent fertility rates and show that lower fertility rates spur increased economic 
growth.   
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However, high levels of economic growth simultaneously cause declines in 
fertility rates, of course.  Back in 1982, Rosenzweig found that households exposed to the 
technologies of the Green Revolution experienced a significant reduction in fertility.  His 
estimation approach relied on experiments in which households were the randomly 
exposed to programs introducing new high-yield technologies and thus present powerful 
evidence of the effect of (agriculturally-based) growth on fertility.  
Demonstrating this relationship on a macro, cross country level has been more 
difficult, of course.7  Dreze and Murthi (2001), for instance, found “no significant 
relations between fertility levels and general indicators of development and 
modernization such as the poverty index, male literacy, and urbanization” (2001: 46).8   
This should not, however, be the end of the story: While finding suitable instruments for 
overall income levels may be an impossible feat to accomplish, finding a plausible source 
of exogenous variation in rural incomes, and more specifically, farm productivity, should 
not be impossible (as argued above).9  In fact, it is among rural farmers where fertility is 
generally the highest and where the returns to female labor (the substitution effect) 
                                                 
7 Further complicating the story is evidence that the distribution of economic (and human capital) resources 
within a society matters.  For instance, de la Croix and Doepke (2002) argue that it is essential to account 
for a country’s fertility differential because it effects the formation of human capital (education).  The 
authors use an “endogenous fertility differential” in their models of economic development.  They find that 
when the variance of human capital rises (in other words, inequality is high), fertility of low-skilled 
households rises and fertility of high-skilled households falls, leaving the total effect in doubt.   
 
8 They did find female literacy had a negative effect and was statistically significant, and the son-preference 
index had a positive and significant effect.   
 
9 Beyond explicit fertility models, other researchers have successfully employed instrumental variable 
techniques to determine the effects of economic development indicators on various health outcomes (which 
of course, may be related to fertility themselves).  Pritchett and Summers (1996), for example, utilize four 
instruments for economic development (terms-of-trade shocks, the ratio of investment to growth, the black 
market premium for foreign exchange, and the deviation of the official exchange rate from its purchasing 
power parity level) and find a significant relationship between with measures of infant and child mortality 
(which, in turn, should affect fertility).   
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should be the most visible.  Thus, in trying to understand the impact of economic 
development, we focus on rural development, and more specifically, land productivity, as 
influenced by technological innovations in seed yields (developed outside the countries 
of interest). 
 
Status of Women 
Demographers and economists have longed searched for variables to measure the 
status of women in modeling fertility patterns.  Female education has become a popular 
proxy for measuring the status of women (Schultz 1994; Al-Qudsi 1998) since female 
education putatively works to change the opportunity cost of childbearing for women.  
Positive changes in female education are likely to impact fertility decisions through 
several interrelated mechanisms: first, increased education, on average, raises a woman’s 
age at marriage; second, gains in educational attainment increase the economic value of 
women’s time; third, positive change in female education increases women’s self-esteem 
and desire for family improvement (i.e. favoring of ‘quality’ children over ‘quantity’) 
(Al-Qudsi 1998).  However, these negative associations between fertility and female 
education are not universally accepted.  Some of the earliest models posited positive 
fertility effects of increased female education (Barro and Lee 1994; Barro and Sala-i-
Martin 1995). 
Several authors have reported substantial negative fertility effects of increased 
female education.  Schultz (1994) finds that an additional year of schooling is associated 
with a twelve percent reduction in total fertility and Klassen (1999) reports that a one-
year increase in female education reduces the fertility rate by 0.25.  Despite these reports 
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of negative fertility effects from gains in female education, the returns are not consistent 
across studies.  Lorgelly, Knowles and Owen (2001) find a very weak relationship 
between female education and fertility.  Others, meanwhile, find that education is 
associated with reductions in fertility only after the completion of primary schooling 
(most likely because wage returns from primary schooling are low or the content of 
primary schooling is poor) (Benefo and Schwartz 1996).   
The endogeneity of female education in fertility models is well-documented 
throughout the literature, and several authors have attempted to overcome this 
simultaneity problem through the use of instrumental variables.  Breierova (2004) uses a 
school construction program in Indonesia to measure the effects of education on both 
fertility and mortality outcomes.  Using school construction as an instrument for average 
parental education, Breierove (2004) reports that mother’s education has a strong 
negative effect on fertility, while father’s education does not.  Dreze and Murthi (2001) 
make a strong claim for a causal relationship between fertility and education through 
fixed effects models examining female literacy.  After controlling for economic 
development indicators (i.e. male literacy, poverty, urbanization), their variable for 
female literacy remains robust.  Although the authors don’t link literacy rates and the 
status of women, they claim a direct causal relationship between literacy and fertility, 
rather than the influence of a third variable on these outcomes.   
Other changes in the status of women are also hypothesized to impact fertility by 
raising women’s age at marriage, changing the gender preferences of child bearers, and 
altering the value of children vis-à-vis work (Mason 1987).  Several authors have 
constructed variables directly measuring the status of women (Balk 1994; Morgan and 
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Niraula 1995; Hindin 2000).  Hindin (2000) examines survey responses from 
Zimbabwean women to measure women’s contribution to household decisions as 
indicators of their autonomy and status.  Morgan and Niraula (1995) use a quasi-
experimental comparison of two Nepali villages to demonstrate the impact of women’s 
autonomy on their fertility choices.  Although both Hindin (2000) and Morgan and 
Niraula (1995) demonstrate correlations between increased autonomy and declining 
fertility, their analyses suffer from problems of endogeneity.  Balk (1994) constructs four 
classifications to measure the status of women: women’s mobility, authority, and 
attitudes, and the leniency of her household towards her.  She uses village-level women’s 
status variables as instruments, claiming that these variables reflect village norms, rather 
than individual status, and should therefore be exogenous to fertility.  In comparison to 
these instruments, Balk finds that traditional measures that serve as proxies for the status 
of women underestimate the impact of women’s status on fertility.   
Amin and Lloyd (2002) challenge the literature purporting a causal relationship 
between the status of women and fertility rates by reporting recent fertility decline in 
Bangladesh and Egypt.  They argue that major declines in fertility in those two countries 
occurred in the absence of changes in the status of women, thereby questioning the 
latter’s validity as a determinant of fertility transition.  The authors claim that “low levels 
of women’s autonomy have been no barrier to fertility decline” (Amin and Lloyd 2002: 
309) in Bangladesh and Egypt.   
 
Family Planning Efforts 
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As explained in Bongaarts (1984), family planning through contraception, sexual 
behavior and abortion, are proximate determinants of fertility which are affected by 
socioeconomic variables such as income, education, and health.  The availability of 
family planning services, therefore, is crucial for the demographic transition to occur; if 
socioeconomic and policy variables are to successfully trigger a transition, then the 
change in desired fertility must be allowed to translate into a change of actual fertility 
through the proximate variables (especially contraception use).  Thus, while 
contraception use and other family planning indicators cannot be included directly in the 
regression (usage is strongly driven by demand, thus causing endogeneity problems), the 
availability of contraception and others services to those who wish to plan their families 
is a necessary element in the demographic transition. 
Some empiricists have attempted to estimate the impact of family planning 
efforts.  Insofar as family planning programs represent the response of government and 
non-profit organizations to parental demands for greater fertility control, family planning 
measurements will be endogenous to fertility models in developing countries (Schultz 
1997).  One strategy to overcome this endogeneity has been to instrument family 
planning programs based on funding provided by the International Planned Parenthood 
Federation (Schultz 1997).  Despite the possibility that these programs may be demand-
driven, and therefore endogenous, Schultz (1997) fails to find significant results.10   
Pritchett (1994) argues that the impact of family planning programs is 
insignificant after controlling for changes in desired fertility.  The analysis demonstrates 
                                                 
10 Although Schultz cannot reject the null hypothesis that family planning is exogenous using the Wu-
Hausman test, he runs models assuming endogeneity and fails to find significant results.  He then runs two 
additional models  one examining the price of oral contraception and the other using country fixed effects.  
Of course, the price of contraception is partially demand driven, so it is endogenous as well. 
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that family planning programs and contraceptive use has little effect on fertility after 
controlling for levels of desired fertility. Gertler and Molyneaux (1994) echo conclusions 
about the non-importance of family planning programs.  They find that changes in 
education and economic development are responsible for observed changes in fertility.   
Reporting research on a random experiment in Bangladesh, Joshi and Schultz 
(2005) present evidence suggesting negative fertility effects resulting from access to 
family planning programs.  Examining two Bangladeshi villages – one in which family 
planning programs were established nearly two decades ago, and one in which family 
planning programs were not established – the authors found that access to family 
planning programs was associated with 0.97 fewer children for women between the ages 
of 40 and 50, and about 0.6 fewer children for women between the ages of 30 and 40 and 
50 and 55.  
 
Data  
We compiled a national-level, cross-country dataset covering the period 1960-
2004.  The demographic data (fertility, infant mortality and child mortality) come from 
the U.N. Population Division.  All other data sources are described below.   (We 
excluded high income country-years as well as those with populations less than 500,000 
individuals [examples include Anguilla, Barbados, Fiji, the United Arab Emirates before 
1975, and Equatorial Guinea].) 
A note on the time series: the time series data we use in this dataset is divided into 
quinquennia, beginning in 1960 and ending in 2004.  This is determined largely by the 
fact that the U.N. Population Division, our main source for demographic data, uses five 
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year averages for several of the key demographic variables considered in our analysis, 
such as TFR and infant and child mortality.   Whenever we have used yearly time series 
data, we compute five year averages for the appropriate quinquennia.11    
 The variables used in the analysis are the following: 
 TFR:  Total fertility rate, or number of children per woman of reproductive age.  
Data from the U.N. Population Division reported as 5 year averages.  
CMR:  Child mortality rate.  Data from the U.N. Population Division on the 
mortality rate in children under the age of 5, collected in averages over 5 year periods.  
This variable, the most putatively sensitive to malaria ecology, is only available for two 
periods, however: 1995-1999 and 2000-2004.  Therefore we use it only in the cross 
country analysis. 
IMR:  Infant mortality rate, or number of infant deaths per thousand live births. 
Data from the U.N. Population Division reported as 5 year averages.  This is available for 
all periods, so when we shift to a country fixed-effects framework, we substitute this 
variable for CMR.  However, this varies quite systematically with CMR, such that the 
correlation in the overlapping periods is .98. 
Index of malaria ecology.  Malaria Ecology is an ecologically-based spatial index 
of the stability of malaria transmission based on the interaction of climate with the 
dominant properties of anopheline vectors of malaria that determine vectorial capacity 
(Kiszewski et al., 2004). The index is constructed on a 0.5 degree spatial grid to derive 
the climatic characteristics of individual months, and then averaged over a 12-month 
                                                 
11 The quinquennia are the following: 1960 through 1964; 1965 through 1969; 1970 through 1974; 1975 




period.  For a complete description of the ME variable see 
http://www.earthinstitute.columbia.edu/about/director/malaria/index.html.  Note that the 
index does not rely on disease incidence or human mortality or morbidity, but instead 
only on biophysical factors, and therefore provides a variable that is ideally exogenous to 
human intervention. 
Area weighted Green Revolution modern variety crops, aggregate for all crops.  
The data gives Green Revolution modern variety crops planted as a percentage of all 
crops planted, weighted by area planted to those crops.  The data covers observations 
from 1960 to 2000, taken in five-year averages.  These estimates were provided by 
Robert E. Evenson at Yale.  We include this variable in a reduced form equation, rather 
than use it as an instrument, since the pathways by which higher crop yields should affect 
fertility are manifold.  Specifically, there are efficiency gains for women’s labor and 
some evidence that Green Revolution technologies such as modern crops raise female 
returns to schooling.  There are also, however, income effects as well, since these crops 
increase total caloric availability to the household.  That said, the relationships may be 
contingent on other factors of production such as fertilizer inputs, farm size, irrigation 
and mechanization.  Given these multiple determinants of the effect of modern crops, we 
chose to use it in a reduced form model rather than trying to explicitly test various 
pathways with poorly measured variables. 
Percent of the population at risk of malaria: We overlay maps of the geographic 
extent of malaria risk in 1965, 1975, 1994 and 2002 from Hay (2004) with a high-
resolution (2.5 arc-minutes) map of 2005 human population from CIESIN (2005).  We 
then calculate the percentage of each country’s population at risk of malaria in 1965, 
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1975, 1994 and 2002, and interpolate to arrive at values for each period in our dataset.  
Note that these percentages are only approximations, since high-resolution maps of 
human population are not available as far back as 1965.  For this reason we decided to 
overlay all of the malaria maps on the 2005 population map.  The variable nevertheless 
captures the changing geographic extent of malaria risk in each country over time. 
Abortion upon request:  Abortion is considered legal for our purposes only if the 
UN deems abortion to be legal and to be available upon request.  Our data for this 
variable was taken from a series of country profiles from the United Nations Population 
Division “Abortion Policies: A Review” (2002), available online at 
http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/abortion/.   
The variable has a value of 0 unless abortion is legal upon request for every single year in 
a given five year period, in which case it is assigned a value of 1.    
While obviously “abortion upon request” is acting as a very imperfect proxy for a 
more contraceptive-friendly climate, we believe that using explicit policy changes within 
countries over time mitigates the concern that it is merely acting as a proxy for general 
cultural attitudes toward birth control.  We can be less certain that policy changes are not 
demand-driven.  However, to mitigate the possibility that contraceptive (and thus 
fertility) changes within countries are driving policy changes with respect to abortion, we 
score the abortion variable prior to the period for which we are measuring fertility.  
Further assuaging endogeneity concerns within a fixed effects framework is the fact that 
the direction of change is not monotonic.  Four countries (Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, and 
Romania) ban and then re-legalize abortion in the sample; such bi-directional policy 
shifts suggest that ideology and politics at the state level are driving legal changes rather 
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than some “bottom up” demand-driven dynamic.  Figure Six, below, shows the 
distribution of abortion upon request legality over our time series. 
Finally, since “abortion upon request” is a strict definition of the legality of 
abortion, we also tried alternatives: whether abortion was legal if the requester provided a 
social or economic reason, whether abortion was legal for health reasons or whether 
abortion was allowed at all.  The problem with these more refined specifications is that 
this multi-category variable was only available for the latest wave of data and hence was 
tested only in the cross-sectional analysis.  However, readers should take comfort in the 
fact that alternative specifications were equally robust within this framework, and, more 
importantly, the parameter estimates of our other variables of interest did not change 
substantially when we altered the abortion variable specification. 
[FIGURE SIX ABOUT HERE] 
 Log of GDP per capita, measure at purchasing-power-parity, in 2000 
international dollars.  Yearly data are taken from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators database (2005).   We calculate our own averages for each 5 year period. 
Female literacy (ages 15-24):  Yearly data taken from the World Bank’s World 
Development Indicators database (2005).   We calculate our own averages for each five-
year period.  We chose this age band to measure female literacy since it was presumed 
that post-puberty adolescence and young adulthood were the critical time periods during 
which “fertility engines” would ignite (Wu 2005) and thus the correct population to 
measure.  Alternate measures for this population such as secondary schooling enrollment 
rates did not change the results for our main variables of interest and truncated the 
number of valid country-years, so we chose to use the literacy rate instead.  
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Region:  We use the World Bank regional classifications, with a dummy variable 
for Sub-Saharan African countries.  Please see the World Bank, World Development 
Indicators (2005) for more information regarding how specific countries are classified.   
Population:  Total population by country in thousands.  Five year averages 
calculated from U.N. Population Division yearly data.  We use this variable as a weight 
for weighted least squares sensitivity analysis. 
 Means and standard deviations for the sample of country-years are presented in 
Table 2, below.  We present un-weighted values, as well as values obtained using weights 
by population size.   Weighting by population size diminishes mean TFR in our sample 
by more than one child per woman, and reduces the mean infant mortality rate by almost 
8 deaths per 1,000 live births.  Mean modern variety crop diffusion is also significantly 
higher (roughly 46% versus 17%), driven by high diffusion in populous countries such as 
India and China.  Abortion upon request also increases significantly (from 0.06 to 0.34), 
again because of China.  For obvious reasons, mean values of region dummies also 
change considerably when we weight by population.  Analysis is robust to weighting by 
population size; however, we present un-weighted regressions. 
   [TABLE TWO ABOUT HERE]    
 
Methods and Findings 
            In order to evaluate the effects of child mortality, income, female literacy, 
abortion policy, and agricultural technology on fertility we employ several statistical 
models on our panel.  We first use reduced form OLS, then OLS with fixed effects, and 
then test which of those two models is preferred.  We then move to an instrumental 
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variables framework (instrumenting for child mortality).  First we use a cross-section, 
using the malaria ecology instrument that does not vary over time.  Next we move to a 
fixed-effects framework by inserting country dummies and replacing the time-invariant 
instrument with one that varies over time (percentage of the population at risk of 
malaria).  In both instrumental variable frameworks, we run formal tests of the presence 
of endogeneity and the strength of the instrument. 
 First, it is worth discussing why we use the infant (under age 1) mortality rate 
instead of the child (under-5) mortality rate in some of our analysis.  Conceptually, the 
effect of child mortality on fertility choices is probably better captured by an under-5 
mortality rate than by an infant mortality rate, since children dying at ages 1-5 would 
impact their parents’ fertility choices.  Further, the impact of malaria on child morbidity 
and mortality is greatest in years 1 to 5 of life.  However, data for IMR are much more 
widely available than for CMR, which means that using CMR would have led us to 
discard a lot of observations which had data on all other variables and IMR.  Thus we 
chose to proceed with IMR as a proxy for CMR for the within-country analysis and stick 
with the conceptually superior measure of CMR for cross-section analysis (though 
substituting IMR into these models does not significantly alter our results).   
[TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE] 
            We begin the reduced form OLS analysis looking simply at regional deviations 
from a baseline time trend (regression (i) in Table 3). Since are interested in sub-Saharan 
Africa, we collapse the other World Bank regions into the suppressed category in order to 
interpret the difference between sub-Saharan Africa and the rest of the developing world. 
 From regression (i) we see that sub-Saharan Africa has a TFR that is roughly 2.1 births 
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above the sample average.  Regression (ii) then looks at the controls we are interested in. 
 The regression surely suffers from endogeneity (we have discussed above how high 
fertility can impact some of the right hand side variables, especially income and child 
mortality), so while it is not a perfect model and does not allow us to deduce causality or 
interpret coefficients, it is enlightening to see the strength of the correlations between 
these variables and fertility.  In this simplified framework, all of the variables come out 
as significant and with predicted signs (high infant mortality are associated with higher 
fertility, while increasing income, increasing women’s literacy and better agricultural 
technology, and availability of abortion all are associated with lower fertility).  Note that 
there are several observations for every country in the sample, so we estimate Huber-
White standard errors robust to clustering within countries in all regressions except (vi), 
since it’s fixed-effects.  Regression (iii) uses the same specification but with IMR instead 
of CMR, in order to use the full time series.  IMR is in fact stronger than CMR in this 
framework, but female literacy is no longer significant.  All the other variables still 
maintain their significance and sign.  Regressions (iv and v) look at the sub-Saharan 
Africa dummy with the controls in these “naïve” models, and finds it to have come down 
to 0.4 or 0.6, respectively, depending of whether we are controlling for CMR or IMR. 
 [The high African fertility rates, according to this model, are caused mainly by the high 
CMR].  Regression (vi) then looks at a fixed-effects framework by inserting country 
dummies (this now discards all cross-country variation and uses the controls only to 
explain within-country variation in TFR).  All the variables, including female literacy, are 
now significant, although interestingly the income variable has switched  sign, so that 
increasing income is now associated with increased  fertility (as predicted by the Barro-
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Becker model).  A Hausman test to compare the two specifications (OLS in regression 
(iii) and fixed-effects in regression (vi)) rejected the null that the OLS model in (iii) is 
valid, leaving us with the fixed effects specification in (vi) as preferred among the 
reduced form models.   
We tested the robustness of the FE regression (vi) by running some alternatives. 
 As a first test, we omit the income variable, since the purported endogeneity of the 
income variable might be biasing other coefficients.  All variables except literacy remain 
significant, and the coefficient on IMR remains at 0.1.  As a second test, we reran 
regression (vi) using an alternative definition of the abortion variable (defining abortion 
as being legal in the 5 years only if it is legal in all 5 years).  The results do not change. 
 [TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE] 
            We next move to the instrumental variables framework in a cross-section (with 
time invariant instruments, as explained above).   Table 4 shows the regression results of 
both the first stage and the second stage least squares.  As before, we estimate Huber-
White standard errors robust to clustering within countries.  The results show CMR 
(instrumented by Malaria Ecology), legality of abortion, and modern variety crops to be 
significant, while literacy and income are not.  We tested the strength of the instrument 
with an F-test in the first stage, and following the convention that an F value greater than 
5 is necessary for the instrument to be strong, we concluded from our F of 11.5 that the 
instrument is strong enough. 
[TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE] 
            We test robustness of this instrumental variables model by running some 
alternatives, as shown in Table 5.  First, in regression (ii), as with the FE robustness tests, 
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we omit the income variable in regression (ii) to get a range for the point estimates of the 
other coefficients.  The CMR coefficient doubles in magnitude (to 0.02), suggesting that 
low income and high CMR are both correlated with, and perhaps caused by, malaria. 
Next, regression (iii) we limit the sample to low-income countries, and the results are 
roughly consistent—again here the coefficient on CMR is double that of the base model 
(i), and the coefficient on the abortion variable rises in magnitude; however, the modern 
variety crops variable is no longer significant (though the point estimate is the same and 
the standard error is higher thanks to the smaller sample size).  The problem is likely that 
the cross-country variation in the crop variable is too small in the restricted sample.  Most 
importantly, the effect of CMR on TFR is robust across all specifications, and the effect 
holds if CMR is replaced with IMR (not shown).  The legality is abortion variable is 
similarly robust and, in fact, appears to be stronger for low income countries.  Finally, it 
is notable that income and literacy do not play a statistically significant role in any of 
these models. 
[TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE] 
            Our last set of models use a fixed-effects framework by adding country dummies, 
and an instrument that varies over time (the percentage of population at risk of malaria). 
 (We now shift to IMR, since that allows for longer panels rather than just the two periods 
for which CMR is available.) Results of the first stage and 2SLS are shown in Table 6, 
and show that IMR, income and crops planted to modern varieties have a statistically 
significant effect on determining within-country variation of TFR (abortion legality and 
literacy are now not significant).  Note that the coefficient on income is positive and 
significant in the structural model.  We test the endogeneity of the IMR variable (the null 
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of exogeneity can be rejected at a one percent alpha level) and for the strength of the 
instrument (the F-test yields a value of 17.24, so we can conclude that the instrument is 
strong).   
            Looking across the various models employed, we can summarize by saying that 
the effect of these variables on TFR have shown various degrees of significance.  The 
most important effect has come from the child survival variable.  The coefficients on 
IMR have ranged between 0.01 in the non-IV fixed-effects specification to 0.06 in the IV 
fixed-effects specification.  This range corresponds to having a decrease of TFR of 0.7 to 
4.4 if IMR is to decrease by 66% from its 1990 value in sub-Saharan Africa (the 
Millennium Development Goal for child mortality).  The coefficient on CMR of 0.01 
from the IV specification (without fixed effects) passed all robustness tests, and this value 
would correspond with a decrease of TFR of 1.2 if CMR is reduced by 66%.  Even this 
conservative value is a powerful effect; a more plausible point estimate based on the 
range of results is that TFR would decrease by 2 with a 66% decrease in child mortality.  
The coefficient on the modern variety crops stays at around -0.01 for all specifications, 
which would indicate that a 50% higher use of modern variety crops would be associated 
with a TFR value lower by 0.5.  Finally, the coefficient on the abortion legality variable 
hovers at around -0.9 across models, which would mean that legalizing abortion on 
request is associated with a 0.9 lower TFR.  Literacy, on the whole, did not have 
significant explanatory power on TFR, and the income variable switched signs between 
across specifications (negative in the cross-country, positive in the fixed-effects). 
 
Discussion: Babies Rule? 
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While we find some evidence for direct government policy (“abortion”) and for 
quality-quantity tradeoff via agricultural productivity improvement (Green revolution), 
the biggest driver quantitatively remains child survival.  This is where the theory of the 
demographic transition started: save the children and families will choose to have fewer 
children.  GDP per capita, urbanization, female literacy, and so on all seem to be less 
important.  This is surprising, on the one hand, but not in contradiction with the fact that 
the demographic transition has proceeded in the widest range of social settings: rural and 
urban, male-dominated and gender equal, impoverished and middle-class (Cleland 2002).  
Since the child mortality transition has also proceeded in a wide range of settings, it is 
plausible that fertility has been driven more by child mortality than by socioeconomic 
status.   
If this conclusion is correct, it heralds the possibility of a rapid fertility transition 
in Africa.  Child survival can be dramatically improved in a short period of time (Lancet, 
2005; UN Millennium Project, 2005).  It is indeed possible, even in a very low income 
setting and within a five-year period, to reduce the child mortality rate from 150 per 
1,000 or above, to well below 100 per 1,000.  Similarly, other determinants of fertility, 
such as adoption of high-yield crop varieties and public policies in support of family 
planning, may change in just a few years, in contrast with many socioeconomic variables.  
Sub-Saharan Africa’s TFR in 2004 was 5.3.  If the Millennium Development Goals are 
achieved and child mortality is decreased by two-thirds, our results would predict a 
decrease in TFR of 2 babies.  A 50% increase in use of modern variety crops would 
decrease TFR by .5, and a less pro-natalist environment (proxied by legalized abortion 
upon request) would decrease TFR by 0.9.  These reductions would correspond to a new 
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TFR in sub-Saharan Africa of just below 2 (replacement rate).  While these predictions 
are very crude, nevertheless the prospect for a rapid, policy-supported transition to lower 
fertility in Africa, say a TFR of less than 3.0 by 2015, looks reasonable.  This will be the 
subject of a follow-up policy analysis. 
More research is needed to continue exploring the causes of rapid fertility 
transitions seen in some countries in the last few decades.  In particular, our models do 
not attempt to understand the lag structure in changes to the independent variables.  A 
future paper will look intensively at case studies of rapid fertility declines and attempt to 
better model lagged effects of the determinants of TFR. 
 The discussion here may also shed light on the role of ecology versus institutions 
in economic development.  To the extent that malaria ecology affects the demographic 
transition as well as mortality rates, the observed high settler mortality rates used by 
Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson (2001) as an instrumental variable for current 
economic institutions would not be appropriate.  The high mortality rates would be 
correlated with an underlying disease ecology which in turn is a direct contributor to 
economic performance through its depressing effect on the demographic transition.  
There are other reasons, too, why malaria can cripple economic development, beyond the 
effects on demography, though the demographic effects are likely to be among the most 
powerful.  In a similar way, settle mortality may be correlated with timing and pathways 
of agricultural transformation as well.  The Green Revolution came first to the temperate 
and sub-tropical regions, and latest to the tropics, the places where settler mortality was 
the highest.  In short, settler mortality is correlated with ecological variables that have a 
direct reach into modern economic development, so that settler mortality can not be 
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deemed to be an appropriate instrument.  This topic is worthy of a longer discussion, 
which we will take up on another occasion.12         
                                                 
12 Indeed, their measures (and those of Easterly and Levine, 2002 & Rodrik, Subramanian and 
Trebb 2002, who also do not control for child or infant mortality in their models) are strongly correlated 
with the prevalence of high-yield seed variety usage, with total fertility rates, with infant mortality, with 
infant mortality net of adult mortality (which is key to the AJR argument), and with infant mortality as 
instrumented by malaria ecology.  We are not the first to hint at a direct effect of climatically determined 
health variables on economic growth. Lorentzen, McMillan and Wacziarg (2005) use a similar strategy to 
show that adult mortality has a direct effect on economic growth, net of institutional context.  However, 
institutional context remains significant in their model; and the adult mortality story is plausibly orthogonal 
to settler mortality given the survivorship story that AJR told.  The same cannot be putatively assumed for 
infant or child mortality. 
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 Table 1: Regional Averages of Area Weighted Aggregates of Modern Variety Crop 
Adoption (Percentages of Crop Coverage)  
 
Regional Averages of Area Weighted Aggreates of % Green Revolution Modern Variety Crop Adoption
1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000
East Asia and Pacific 0 1 7 15 21 26 33 40 48
Europe (Turkey only) 0 0 7 21 28 29 29 39 45
Latin America and Caribbean 0 1 3 6 11 14 19 22 27
Middle East and North Africa 0 0 2 8 10 13 16 24 32
South Asia 0 0 13 29 41 45 54 62 68
Sub-Saharan Africa 0 0 0 0 1 3 5 8 11
Source: Robert E. Evenson  
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Table 2: Means and Standard Deviations of Variables Used in Analysis
Un-weighted Population weighted Un-weighted Population w
Variable
TFR 4.89 3.99 1.96 1.73
Infant mortality rate 84.2 74.93 50.3 40.1
Female Literacy (Ages 15-24) 73.04 75.21 28.3 24.0
Log of GDP per capita, PPP 7.9 7.72 0.84 0.75
Share of crops planted to modern varieties (MVs) 10.64 35.26 17.9 29.2
Abortion on request 0.21 0.38 0.41 0.49
Malaria Ecology Index 4.6 2.2 7.14 4.9
Percentage of population at risk of malaria 0.58 0.66 0.41 0.31
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy 0.33 0.11 0.47 0.32
Year 1980.2 1983.13 12.89 12.5
Mean Standard Deviation
*Means and standard deviations computed for entire sample, excluding high income countries and countries with populations smaller than 500,000
individuals.
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Figure 1: Total Fertility in 2000, by Country 
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Figure 2: Malaria Ecology, by Country 
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Figure 5: Abortion on Demand by Country 
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Table 3: Reduced Form OLS and Fixed-Effects Regressions of Total Fertility Rates
(i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi)
Dependent Variable: TFR TFR TFR TFR TFR TFR
Independent Variables
Sub-Saharan Africa dummy 2.08 0.38 0.56
(8.27) (1.44) (2.31)
Literacy of females ages 15-24 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(-1.33) (-1.10) (-1.85) (-1.43) (-2.71)
Log GDP per capita, at PPP prices -0.54 -0.37 -0.6 -0.32 0.36
(-2.99) (-2.43) (-3.29) (-2.16) (2.64)
Child Mortality Rate 0.01 0.01
(4.89) (2.86)
Infant Mortality Rate 0.02 0.02 0.01
(4.41) (3.42) (5.05)
Legality of Abortion on demand -0.85 -0.89 -0.79 -0.82 -0.61
(-3.14) (-2.79) (3.28) (-2.72) (-3.06)
% crops planted to modern varieties -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02
(-2.49) (-3.40) (-2.14) (-2.54) (-4.53)
Year -0.08 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04
(-12.84) (-3.70) (-3.67) (-4.11) (-4.57) (-5.87)
constant 165.98 65.18 62.42 72.64 78.24 79.86
(13.13) (4.26) (3.93) (4.69) (4.83) (6.19)
N = 415 140 415 140 415 415
R-squared = 0.54 0.86 0.79 0.86 0.80 0.95
t-statistics in parentheses
Sample excludes high-income countries and countries with populations below 500,000




Dependent Variable: CMR TFR
Independent Variables
Literacy of females ages 15-24 -0.54 -0.01
(-3.48) (-0.72)
Log GDP per capita, at PPP prices -42.40 -0.4
(-10.13) (-1.47)
Child Mortality Rate 0.01
(instrumented) (2.70)
Legality of Abortion on demand 4.02 -0.86
(0.43) (-3.37)








N = 138 138
R-squared = 0.82 0.86
Table 4: IV-Regressions (no Fixed-Effects) of Total 
Fertility Rate – First and Second Stages
Instrument for CMR is Malaria Ecology
Sample excludes high-income countries and countries with populations 
below 500,000
Regression has robust standard errors through clustering by country
Regression (i) is the first-stage regression, (ii) is the 2SLS
F-test of the null of the instruments' effects on CMR yields an F of 11.47.  
Instrument is therefore found to be strong.
 
 49
Table 5: Alternate and Sub-sample Specifications of the IV Model
(i) (ii) (iii)
Dependent Variable: TFR TFR TFR
Independent Variables
Literacy of females ages 15-24 -0.01 -0.01 0.00
(-0.72) (-0.89) (-0.34)
Log GDP per capita, at PPP prices -0.4 -0.56
(-1.47) (-1.08)
Child (under-5 Mortality Rate) 0.01 0.02 0.02
(instrumented) (2.70) (4.13) (2.12)
Legality of Abortion on demand -0.86 -0.83 -1.20
(-3.37) (-3.90) (-2.59)
% crops planted to modern varieties -0.01 -0.01 -0.01
(-2.03) (-2.04) (-1.53)
Year -0.03 -0.03 -0.03
(-3.66) (-3.27) (-1.88)
constant 65.30 59.51 63.48
(4.21) (3.56) (2.10)
N = 138 138 67
R-squared = 0.86 0.84 0.75
(i) is the original specification; (ii) excludes the income variable; (iii) limits the sample to low-
income countries
t-statistics in parentheses
Instrument for CMR is Malaria Ecology
Sample excludes high-income countries and countries with populations below 500,000




Dependent Variable: IMR TFR
Independent Variables
Infant Mortality Rate 0.06
(3.67)
Log GDP per capita, at PPP prices -0.82 0.40
(-0.30) (2.03)
Literacy of females ages 15-24 -0.26 0.00
(-2.88) (0.28)
Legality of Abortion on demand -5.39 -0.31
(-1.36) (-1.03)
% crops planted to modern varieties -0.07 -0.01
(-0.96) (-2.01)






N = 415 415
R-squared = 0.96 0.90
t-statistics in parentheses
Table 6: First Stage and Second Stage IV Regressions 
with Country Fixed Effects
Sample excludes high-income countries and countries with populations 
below 500,000
Regression (i) is the first-stage regression, (ii) is the 2SLS
F-test of the null of the instrument's effects on IMR yields an F of 17.24.  
Instrument is therefore found to be strong.
IMR instrumented with % population at risk of malaria
Regression includes country dummies, not reported
 
